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This article examines the public authority of chiefs’ courts within the United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Protection of Civilians Sites (PoCs). 
After December 2013, UNMISS peacekeepers opened the gates of their bases to 
around 200,000 civilians fleeing war. This unintentionally created a legal and politi-
cal anomaly. Over time, conflicts and crimes rose within the sites, and UNMISS 
improvised a form of administration. But while the internationals sought techni-
cal solutions, people displaced within the sites turned to familiar ‘customary’ 
methods to manage problems of insecurity, establishing chiefs’ courts. The PoC 
sites became an arena of plural authorities, with chiefs working alongside camp 
administrators, peacekeepers and humanitarian actors. We explore how and why 
the chiefs responded to insecurity within the sites and whether they engaged 
with, or diverged from United Nations actors and international norms. We demon-
strate that justice remains central to the provision of security in contexts of war 
and displacement. International peace interventions are rightly wary of ‘custom-
ary’ justice processes that prioritise communities and families at the expense of 
individual rights, but this unique case shows that they are sources of trust and 
consistency that are resilient, adaptable and can contribute to human security.
A husband accused his wife of adultery in a 
customary court in a ‘Protection of Civilians’ 
site (PoC) in Juba, South Sudan, in March 
2017. His claim was rejected for lack of evi-
dence and the chiefs ruled that the woman 
should move to her family’s house and the 
couple should ‘receive counselling’, but they 
were not able to enforce this decision. For 
one thing, the sites were under the authority 
of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS), a regime which did not regard 
adultery as a crime. For another, UNMISS 
did not recognise the authority of the chiefs’ 
courts and kept its distance from many of the 
disputes they tried to reckon with. The chiefs 
knew that interfamilial problems could rap-
idly become intercommunal ones and erupt 
into violence in the volatile, traumatised 
setting of the camp. They sought to man-
age relationships and prevent tensions from 
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escalating. In this case, their judgement was 
ignored, and interpersonal and self-inflicted 
violence ensued. The husband refused to 
respect the court’s decision and forced the 
wife to return to his home; she later hanged 
herself, committing suicide.1 The case reflects 
some of the grave dilemmas facing local and 
international authorities concerned with 
promoting security during protracted crises 
and war. It provides grounds to re-examine 
the connections between justice and security 
in contexts of war and displacement, and to 
identify implications for international peace 
missions and humanitarian interventions.
Situations of protracted violent conflict 
and crisis are usually defined by the erosion 
of the rule of law and legitimate political 
authorities. Yet while states are in crisis and 
international actors have intervened to ‘pro-
tect civilians’, local authorities may be central 
to justice and security provision. ‘Customary’ 
ideas about security and social accountabil-
ity flourish even when states or international 
actors promote competing notions of law 
and morality (Macdonald and Allen 2015; 
Porter 2015; Weigand 2017). Relatedly, we 
know that refugee sites tend to be character-
ized by plural jurisdictions and understand-
ings of law. The vulnerability of refugees does 
not stem from their demand for justice (Riach 
and James 2016) and displaced people do not 
simply accept a state of ‘legal limbo’ but show 
‘agency within the legal field’ (Holzer 2013).
Southern Sudan has been mired in civil 
war, mass killings and extensive human 
rights violations for decades. In 2011, South 
Sudan gained its independence and UNMISS 
was authorised to ‘support the Government 
in peace consolidation’ including ‘establish-
ing the rule of law, and strengthening the 
security and justice sectors’ (UNMISS n.d.). 
After war broke out again in 2013, the mis-
sion remained with a new priority to ‘protect 
civilians’. UNMISS responded to the crisis 
by providing temporary asylum within their 
bases for civilians whose lives were under 
threat. Within a few years, some 200,000 
civilians had taken refuge in sites scattered 
across the country (UNMISS, 2016). They fled 
there to escape the targeted killings of civil-
ians, including by government forces, as well 
as to avoid fighting between the South Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government 
forces and rebels of the SPLA in-Opposition 
(SPLA-IO). As the war continued, the bases 
became ‘Protection of Civilians sites’. They 
were transformed into unique humanitarian 
spaces under UNMISS authority, from which 
warring parties were mostly excluded. Yet the 
PoCs also reflected in microcosm some ele-
ments of the insecurity and plural forms of 
authority and law that prevailed outside their 
boundaries, and UNMISS struggled to main-
tain control.
UNMISS set a precedent in international 
protection by hosting civilians within its 
bases for several years, but it fell far short of 
fulfilling its protection mandate. The mission 
barely even attempted to protect the major-
ity of civilians who remained outside of the 
PoCs. It initially pushed back against human-
itarian initiatives in the PoC, concerned 
that these would prolong people’s stay, but 
allowed the supply of food, water, medicine 
and other necessities. It had difficulty exclud-
ing small arms and former combatants from 
the sites (CIVIC 2015: 13). It concentrated 
security provision on maintaining a physical 
barrier to separate those in the PoCs from 
armed forces outside.
Tragically, on several occasions, the peace-
keepers failed to guard the perimeters of the 
PoCs effectively and to protect residents from 
attacks. In April 2014, 47 civilians were killed 
and at least 100 injured in an attack on Bor 
PoC (Arenson 2016: 34). In February 2016, 
UNMISS was accused of a ‘glaring failure’ to 
defend people in the Malakal PoC against 
an attack which left more than 25 dead and 
120 injured (MSF 2016: 2). In July 2016, 53 
South Sudanese civilians were killed and 234 
injured in attacks upon the Juba PoC sites; 
a Chinese peacekeeper was killed and hun-
dreds more people were raped or murdered 
in the vicinity of the Juba PoCs (UNMISS and 
OHCHR 2017: 15–16).
Meanwhile, UNMISS encountered problems 
of insecurity and criminality within the PoCs 
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on an everyday basis. By September 2015, 
2,900 security incidents were recorded (UNSC 
2015b). These ranged across a wide spectrum 
from killings, sexual violence, crime and attacks 
against UN and humanitarian personnel 
and included issues such as inter-communal 
fighting, theft, gang violence, and domestic 
violence (UNSC 2015a; see also UNMISS HRD 
2015: 16). Other disputes between individu-
als, or within families, related to bride wealth, 
adultery, and minor assaults went unrecorded 
in such reports, but arose on a routine basis, 
according to our research. Insecurity was rife 
amid the social disruption and uncertainty of 
displacement.
UNMISS faced disorder within the camps 
but it lacked the legal mandate and mecha-
nisms of justice to resolve disputes and 
prosecute crimes. The PoCs were under a 
quasi-government of the UN and the inter-
national regimes of law that it embodied. 
UNMISS’ powers were constrained by its man-
date and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
with the Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan. The mission was not prepared 
for an executive policing role, either legally, 
or in terms of policy and resources. It did not 
have the legal authority required for prosecu-
tions, and the South Sudanese state retained 
sovereignty over the PoCs, even if South 
Sudanese law could not be enforced within 
the sites without the mission’s consent (Stern 
2015: 11). In essence, United Nations Police 
(UNPOL) had responsibility for policing the 
site, but had neither the mandate, nor ade-
quate personnel to police the displaced peo-
ple, as acknowledged in a UN review (UNSC 
2015: 10).
Customary chiefs and other community 
leaders rapidly stepped in to fill gaps in jus-
tice and security mechanisms within the 
PoCs. In one sense, this was predictable; cus-
tomary chiefs and their courts have persisted, 
adapted and governed at local levels amid 
South Sudan’s previous rounds of conflicts 
and killings (Leonardi 2013). Yet their estab-
lishment in the new setting of the PoCs was 
a natural experiment. It allows us to observe 
the invigoration and construction of chiefly 
authority, and its changes and continuities 
under a novel form of global governance. It 
also calls for us to explore the divergences 
and interactions between ‘customary’ notions 
of security and those promoted by interna-
tional peacekeepers and humanitarians.
Firstly, we examine the historical sig-
nificance of chiefs’ courts and how chiefs 
reproduced their authority through the 
establishment of justice processes within the 
United Nations sites. In the second part of the 
article, we discuss UNMISS’ efforts to estab-
lish security and the extent to which the mis-
sion sought to influence customary authority. 
Finally, we discuss the decisions of chiefs’ 
courts, what these reveal about the contribu-
tions of the courts to security, and the rela-
tions between local and international norms 
and practices of justice.
Our findings are principally based on 
records from 395 court cases gathered in the 
Juba and Bentiu PoCs from July 2015–2016, 
as well as ethnographic research and docu-
mentary sources.2 We involved a group of 
paralegals and researchers from the PoC com-
munities as court observers; their concerns 
about insecurity in the sites also informed 
the research. We analysed the archive of court 
observations and provide selected cases as 
illustrations.
During the period examined, the status of 
chiefly authority in the PoCs remained inde-
terminate and their contribution to security 
was precarious. The courts and their decisions 
were not officially acknowledged by UNMISS, 
even though UNPOL relied upon community 
actors to help resolve disputes. The lack of clar-
ity in relationships between chiefs and other 
authorities, and the reluctance of UNMISS 
to recognise and actively support the courts, 
contributed to the more general uncertain-
ties of life in the camp. There were opportuni-
ties for people to evade the courts and to seek 
assistance from alternative authorities, so 
chiefs had no guarantee that their decisions 
would be implemented. The courts promoted 
the concept of a common Nuer identity that 
in some ways paralleled constructs employed 
by military-political elites to build support for 
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armed opposition. Plus, court decisions deliv-
ered judgements that routinely undermined 
the rights of women and youth, contradicting 
international human rights principles that 
UNMISS aimed to uphold.
Nevertheless, the chiefs contributed to 
unifying the dispersed sections of the Nuer 
within the camp, in aid of security. Chiefs’ 
courts became a popular justice forum within 
the PoCs. Their dialogical and transparent 
justice processes contributed to binding 
together the diverse group of displaced peo-
ple and to managing disputes between them. 
The accessibility and regularity of the court 
processes were the bedrock of their contri-
butions to security and to chiefly legitimacy. 
Customary authorities held sway, despite the 
presence of international protection forces.
There were tensions between international 
and customary norms of security and justice, 
and between different security providers in 
the camp, but they shared concerns about 
insecurity and interacted with each other. 
On occasion, chiefs referenced human rights 
principles they associated with UNMISS in 
their decisions, paying some attention to 
international norms. International actors also 
innovated, although their responses were ad 
hoc and inconsistent. UNPOL supported com-
munity policing, but did not acknowledge 
the civil authority of the courts, although this 
was needed to restrain the new community 
police. With no overarching authority and 
a lack of consistency and trust in relations 
between chiefs and UNMISS, the security situ-
ation within the camps has been unstable. 
The chiefs’ courts in the PoCs show adaptive 
responses to the turbulent conditions of war 
and displacement that international interven-
tions must learn from, and find better ways 
to engage.
Establishing Chiefly Authority in the 
PoCs
The political landscape in South Sudan 
includes plural or competing public authori-
ties that command legitimacy or ‘a minimum 
of voluntary compliance’, including chiefs, 
church leaders and militia groups. Although 
they do not fit standard institutional catego-
ries and have a plastic and contingent ten-
dency, remaining unstable and constantly 
in formation, these everyday political actors 
should not be underestimated (Lund 2006). 
Public authorities can establish their legiti-
macy through public goods provision 
(Hoffman and Kirk 2013: 9) including through 
justice mechanisms. Whether they manifest 
as a ‘protection racket’ or ‘legitimate protec-
tor’ (Tilly cited in Kaldor 2014: 65), or combine 
elements of both, they are of central relevance 
to the question of how to establish security 
in protracted conflicts and crises. Chiefs mat-
ter politically, both within and outside of the 
PoCs, based on the resilience of their author-
ity historically and its resurgence in this new 
humanitarian setting.
Chiefly authority in South Sudan
The political significance of chiefs and their 
association with government has varied over 
time and space in South Sudan, but chiefs 
generally cemented their authority by being 
able to ‘deal’ with government, and broker 
relations between it and ‘home’ communi-
ties (Leonardi 2013). Governments in South 
Sudan have co-opted chiefs as part of their 
local structures of government, while chiefs 
have also made use of governmental power. 
The chiefs’ courts were an initiative of the 
Anglo-Egyptian government in the early 
20th Century (Johnson 1986); they were for-
mally recognised in the 1930s as part of 
‘native administration’ and have been used 
by colonial and post-colonial governments 
since. The post-2005 Government of South 
Sudan entrenched customary law and chiefly 
authority in its constitutions. However, chiefly 
authority is not simply delegated; it must be 
won through displaying allegiance to the 
community and acting as an arbiter of cus-
tomary law.
Chiefs’ courts and customary law rely on the 
fiction of continuity with normative traditions 
that predate colonialism, but have evolved 
from a complex intermingling of local, 
national and international influences, hav-
ing been refashioned to satisfy political and 
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social pressures, shifting ethical foundations 
and the demands of daily life. While many 
chiefs’ courts claim to apply an established set 
of laws – such as the Wathalel laws amongst 
the Dinka or the Fangak laws amongst the 
Nuer – there is variation in their application 
and judgements also depend upon situational 
interpretations (Leonardi et al 2010: 28).
Most importantly, chiefs’ courts have been 
considerable experience of violence preven-
tion. Chiefs have used courts to set limits 
to violence: there is still a ‘strong percep-
tion that the courts are the principal means 
of avoiding violent outcomes of disputes’ 
(Leonardi et al 2010: 30; Santschi 2014: 49). 
People have engaged with courts in pursuit 
of protection, social regulation and security, 
even when other legal forums are available 
(such as statutory courts). In turn, local gov-
ernment authorities have held customary 
courts accountable for insecurity when they 
fail to settle cases. Both historically and in the 
present, chiefs and their courts have upheld 
a form of authority grounded in civil proce-
dures, against military alternatives. But they 
have also been implicated in violence and 
human rights abuses. The courts have fre-
quently been responsible for ‘chronic miscar-
riages of justice for violence against women’ 
(Mennen 2010: 218; Ibreck et al 2017: 10–11).
Courts in the PoCs
Local leaders assembled customary chiefs’ 
courts soon after entering the Juba and Bentiu 
PoCs and they functioned on a routine basis 
thereafter. Our court reports demonstrate a 
steady flow of court hearings – an estimated 
average of fifteen hearings per week. They 
heard cases within a matter of days after a 
complaint was reported. The courts were gen-
erally held publicly under a tree by a panel 
ranging from four up to seventeen chiefs, and 
sometimes including one or two women. The 
hearings often lasted for several hours. As 
well as the parties to the case and the court 
panel, there were always other residents of 
the PoCs in attendance, usually more than 
fifteen, sometimes over fifty. The courts col-
lected fees and issued substantial fines and 
punishments. Their decisions were taken seri-
ously, and usually accepted, by all the parties. 
The power of customary authority was appar-
ent in the payment of court fees that ranged 
from 100 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) 
upwards3 and in the acceptance of decisions 
that included fines and punishments.
People had the freedom to seek, or comply 
with, customary prescriptions in the con-
text of the PoCs, at least to a greater degree 
than was possible in any other part of South 
Sudan. Indeed, they had reasons not to 
attend, since the courts were not officially 
recognised by UNMISS, while elsewhere cus-
tomary authorities have often been implicitly 
backed by the force of government. There 
was some resistance to the voices of custom, 
especially from youth gangs (Justice Africa 
2016: 56). However, there was also consider-
able evidence of routine justice-seeking and 
voluntary compliance with the courts.
Constituting Community
Chiefly authority relies on a conception of 
‘home community’, and the courts were 
active in making this meaningful. The dis-
placed people were far from being a cohesive 
group, although the majority in both the 
Juba and Bentiu sites were of Nuer ethnicity.4 
Instead, the residents reflected existing social 
cleavages among Nuer people, including dif-
ferences in regional, clan and section identi-
ties, and in experiences of wealth, education 
and urban or rural living. Residents in the 
Bentiu PoC sites included people who previ-
ously lived in urban Bentiu, as well as people 
who lived abroad and people who had pre-
viously never left their rural, home village. 
In Juba, residents came from across South 
Sudan and included people who came to the 
capital for a plethora of different reasons, 
such as education, jobs and refuge. In addi-
tion, Nuer people had diverse experiences of 
government and political allegiances.
Most people in the PoCs had experienced 
successive traumatic events. In a survey over 
95 per cent of people reported that a mem-
ber of their household had been victim of one 
or more violent crimes, most of them conflict 
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related between 2013 and 2015 (Deng and 
Willems 2016: 3). Families were torn apart; 
they had lost relatives, livelihoods and assets, 
such as cattle and land due to the war (see 
Deng et al 2015: 16). As people ran to the PoCs, 
they became detached from former roles and 
relationships. Notions of community and cus-
tom were disturbed and had to be constituted 
within the new setting of the camp.
The processes of identity construction 
were not confined to the camp but were 
also being shaped by and feeding into wider 
political processes, including the ambitions 
of warring parties. Political and military lead-
ers deployed ethnic narratives as a strategy 
to mobilise supporters during war. Their task 
was complicated by historical grievances and 
bloodshed between Nuer, especially in the 
1990s (Johnson 2003). The targeting of Nuer 
civilians during war created a traumatic bond 
that leaders sought to instrumentalise, but 
divisions emerged and political allegiances 
were both forged and contested by Nuer 
elites during the war. Notably, while most 
Nuer elites joined the SPLA-IO, members of 
the Bul Nuer sided with government (Small 
Arms Survey 2016). Political competitions on 
the outside contributed to concepts of iden-
tity within the sites.
The chiefs forged unity around the idea of 
a shared territorial homeland – a ‘Nuerland’. 
Chiefs were selected to the court to represent a 
‘home’ county in the ‘Nuerland’, although the 
counties were politically-unstable administra-
tive units whose boundaries were changed 
by military and political interventions during 
the conflict. The counties served as an organi-
sational device: by having chiefly representa-
tives from each county the courts could claim 
to represent all the people of the Nuerland. 
But it also reinforced an ideal of a territorially-
linked identity associated with the war, and 
obscured the reality that most of the displaced 
people had fled to the camp from multi-ethnic 
urban settings, not ‘home’ counties.
Relatedly, the courts were integral to the 
process of making chiefly authority and legiti-
macy. The status of chief was conferred within 
the sites, and had to be reinforced there. The 
chiefs volunteered and were chosen by peo-
ple from their ‘home’ communities, who were 
asked to select and vote for a chief based on 
their reputation for honesty, impartiality and 
trustworthiness (Ibreck and Pendle 2016: 24). 
Some of the chiefs who were appointed had 
no prior experience of the role. They con-
structed their legitimacy by resolving dis-
putes and nurturing collective identity in the 
courts.
The courts promoted Nuer unity and con-
structed the legitimacy of chiefs in the PoC. 
They physically brought people together on 
a regular basis, for formal and informal inter-
actions around what it means to be a com-
munity. They upheld a notion that all Nuer 
can receive justice from a common court, 
irrespective of origin or political or economic 
status. Chiefs narrated customary laws as if 
they were a fixed set of principles that consti-
tuted a common Nuer tradition, even though 
‘Nuer law’ is known to have persistent local 
variations (Howell 1954; Johnson 1986). In 
these ways, they produced an idea of a shared 
moral community, contrasting with the reali-
ties of historical and recent experiences. Law 
was conceived as a guide to morality and an 
expression of continuity with an (imagined) 
peaceful, homogenous past. Still, the authority 
of the courts remained precarious, given the 
insecurity of their present situation.
International Justice and Security
UNMISS had a responsibility to confront the 
problems of justice and security in the camp, 
but was wary of involving and empower-
ing customary authorities. The mission was 
expected to conform to and promote inter-
national human rights norms – these were 
at the core of its original purpose and inte-
gral to the practical tasks that it set out to 
achieve, including the promotion of the rule 
of law, civilian protection and human rights 
monitoring (UNMISS 2017). The concep-
tions of security, law and justice espoused by 
UNMISS contrast with well-known tenden-
cies of chiefs’ courts, such as the lack of legal 
representation, discrimination and violence 
against women (Mennan 2010).
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Although UNMISS lacked the mandate for 
executive policing, over time it developed pol-
icies aimed at improving security in the PoCs, 
including ‘holding facilities’ and assessments 
to determine when a suspect or offender 
could be excluded from the camp. But these 
were limited, bureaucratic measures and UN 
staff themselves expressed concern that their 
responses failed to meet international human 
rights standards, due to prolonged periods of 
‘holding’ suspects and risks associated with 
‘handovers’ and expulsions (UNSC 2015b: 8; 
Stern 2015; Justice Africa 2016).
Unable to resolve the dilemmas of secu-
rity and justice within the camp indepen-
dently, UNMISS involved community actors 
in a variety of ways, both formally and infor-
mally. Its main contributions were to sup-
port community-led management structures 
within the camp, and support for community 
policing. On paper, the mission recognised 
‘traditional leaders’ should be included in con-
flict transformation initiatives – ‘to strengthen 
their role as arbiters and mediators within dia-
logue processes’ (UNSC 2015b: 10–11), but 
its interactions with the chiefs were neither 
coherent nor sustained.
The mission failed to develop clear and 
effective policies in response to the problem 
of justice provision within the PoCs. At first 
it encouraged an Informal Mediation and 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism (IMDRM). 
The IMDRM concept echoed elements of 
the chiefs’ courts, but its guidelines aimed 
to reduce and limit their powers, including 
by avoiding sexual or gender-based violence 
cases to avoid breaches of UN standards (Stern 
2015: 12). The intention was to mediate and 
manage conflict – to ‘prevent the escalation 
of and mitigate disputes’5 – rather than to 
act in a judicial capacity, and it was expected 
to work without issuing fines and punish-
ments. The result was opaque, with some PoC 
residents assuming the IMDRM was the UN 
name for their chiefs’ courts, while UNMISS 
held back from publicly acknowledging the 
chiefs’ judicial authority.
This equivocation was not surprising. 
UNMISS Human Rights Division was critical of 
customary courts outside the PoCs for acting 
beyond constitutional limitations during the 
conflict, and imposing cultural norms that vio-
late the rights of women and girls. An investi-
gation concluded that courts are ‘adjudicating 
on cases beyond their jurisdiction, violating 
fair trial standards, and imposing illegal fines 
and sentences in contravention of national 
laws and international human rights princi-
ples’ (UNMISS HRD 2015: 30). Humanitarian 
agencies working in the PoCs also expressed 
concern about the risks of harm from the cus-
tomary courts – while recognising that they 
might contribute to violence reduction, they 
called for monitoring of court decisions to 
encourage fairness and prevent harms (South 
Sudan Protection Cluster 2014).
Some compromises and tacit understand-
ings developed. UNPOL did not regulate 
the daily practices of the courts. But the 
UN police officers could be contacted when 
complaints arose. They also insisted that the 
chiefs should not have the power to handle 
the most serious cases involving rape or mur-
der, which had to be referred to UNPOL.
UNPOL made efforts to provide guidance 
and training to volunteer youths to under-
take community policing as members of a 
Community Watch Group (CWG) through 
occasional workshops. The aim was to reduce 
violence and criminality within the camps in 
general, but the hope was also that it would 
improve communication between UNPOL 
and the IDPs. During one such training ses-
sion, UNPOL officers stressed that security 
for people in the sites required ‘cooperation 
and coordination’; they called on the train-
ees to help enforce rules and prevent crimi-
nal activities, including increasing assaults 
by IDPs upon UNPOL officers (UNPOL 2015).
The boundaries between UN initiatives 
and customary authorities were sometimes 
blurred and the representatives of ‘custom’ 
and their relationship with UNMISS evolved 
over time. But UNMISS’ approach was largely 
a functional one and privileged policing over 
judicial mechanisms. Its attempt to influ-
ence the courts, the IMDRM, exemplified a 
view that the courts were a potentially useful 
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mechanism for dispute resolution – that could 
be reformed and made to function better; it 
did not reflect a recognition of the courts’ role 
in the constitution of legitimate authority and 
moral community. Actions by the internation-
als suggested a willingness to explore coopera-
tion, and an implicit reliance upon customary 
authorities; but were neither coherent nor 
consistent.
Courts in Practice
We now turn to an examination of how the 
courts functioned in practice. The majority of 
cases brought to the courts during the court 
observation research period (July 2015–2016) 
related to familial matters, including peti-
tions for divorce, and claims of adultery. There 
were also instances of petty crimes, including 
theft. We focus our analysis on cases relating 
directly to physical violence and insecurity or 
human rights issues.
Dealing with Physical Violence
Chiefs’ courts were proactive in trying to pre-
vent or stem violence. The chiefs recognized 
that the most serious cases could not be 
dealt with and had to be referred to UNPOL, 
but they were ready to handle a range of 
accusations relating to beatings, domestic 
violence and fighting between individuals 
and groups. They also took cases that were 
brought in fear of future violence. It was 
common for a case to be ‘brought to court 
in order to prevent a quarrel and avoid the 
fighting between two parties’. A common 
reason given for a judgement was ‘to try to 
avoid a fight and solve the case’.
It is striking how quickly cases that might 
provoke anger were heard – disputes could 
be dealt with through the courts in days or 
even hours when they were treated as urgent 
matters. For instance, a seven-year-old child in 
Juba PoC3 was injured in a traffic accident on 
10 October 2015 in the evening. The follow-
ing morning, the motorcyclist accused of the 
injury was brought to court and the parents 
received a swift settlement and compensation.
The courts’ timely responses did not prevent 
people from raising longstanding grievances. 
A person bringing a case in anger or distress 
had a good chance that their complaint 
would be heard at length and accepted, even 
after the passage of time. We see this in a case 
on 17 November 2015, brought by a young 
woman who accused her neighbour of fight-
ing with her and injuring her baby while she 
was pregnant. Their fight at the water point 
had occurred nine months previously, and 
the complainant was convinced that it caused 
the infant’s death. The accused admitted the 
fight but rejected the charges. The complain-
ant did not report the case at the time, and 
no medical evidence was presented, but this 
did not prevent the chiefs from ruling in her 
favour and awarding compensation of five 
cows. The crowd was growing restive, ‘secu-
rity was poor’. The chiefs saw the ‘need to 
bring down the tense situation between the 
two families since the child died.’
The chiefs strived to prevent people taking 
matters into their own hands. The risks of 
intercommunal violence were starkly appar-
ent from fighting between hundreds of IDPs, 
that ended in one death and 32 injuries in 
the Juba PoCs on 8–11 May 2015 (Arenson 
2016: 33). The battle was sparked by the dis-
covery that a girl from one section, the Haak 
Nuer, had been made pregnant out of wed-
lock by the member of another, the Bul Nuer, 
and that the young man refused to pay cus-
tomary bride wealth. The peacekeepers were 
unable to halt the clashes which ended only 
after the chiefs mobilised an ‘N4’ community 
security force, made up of youth members 
of each of the Nuer sections, and brought 
together parties for mediation.
The courts were persistently engaged in 
efforts to limit the ‘cycles of more revenge and 
counter revenge’ that have been a historic fea-
ture of conflicts in South Sudan (Jok 2014: 18). 
A case in Bentiu is a direct illustration of this. 
On 14 June 2016, a young man brought a case 
to the chiefs’ court in the Bentiu PoC against 
an elderly man who attacked him with a knife. 
The accused explained that he was seeking 
revenge for the killing of one of his relatives 
in December 2015 by one of the young man’s 
relatives. The chiefs responded with strong 
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condemnation: ‘We came here [the PoC] for 
protection and not to kill each other.’ They 
fined the elderly man three cows and a sen-
tence of imprisonment for six months and 
praised the complainant for bringing the mat-
ter to court rather than fighting back. Both 
parties accepted the judgement.
Many everyday cases of violent assault were 
also brought to the courts. In these cases, 
we often see reasoning that seeks to answer 
the harm with compensation and significant 
efforts to punish perpetrators with heavy 
fines or even prison sentences. A financial set-
tlement was often presented as a solution. For 
instance, on 1 May 2016 a man who admitted 
to beating another man who had ‘verbally 
abused him’ was fined 5500 SSP as ‘medical 
costs’, although the details of the treatment 
were not specified. In most cases fines were 
issued, and in some cases punishment was 
more severe. This could include a sentence of 
‘imprisonment’, which had to be improvised 
as a house arrest under the surveillance of the 
family, chief or CWG.
The chiefs’ responses to instances of vio-
lence seemed to depend largely upon the 
implications of the violence not for the indi-
vidual victim, but for the community. In this 
calculation, the needs of vulnerable people 
could easily be trumped by wider security con-
siderations. Such judgements placed chiefs’ 
courts in contravention of individual human 
rights norms. The chiefs envisaged an ideal 
of community security, to be established and 
maintained through peaceful relationships.
Handling Domestic Issues
Chiefs often heard and dismissed accusations 
of gender-based violence, especially domes-
tic violence. Such cases were often brought 
to court by women seeking a divorce, yet they 
rarely won. Instead, the women’s needs for 
protection were overlooked in favour of the 
social and economic interests of the husband 
and family.
Customary norms consider that when a 
marriage takes place, the newly-related fami-
lies have social and economic interests in its 
continuity. Those who provide cattle to the 
groom, often including his uncles and friends, 
will expect cattle from his own daughters’ 
marriages. The wife’s father will have also 
gained and shared cattle from the marriage, 
and divorce would demand that these cattle 
be returned. The wife’s needs are subsumed 
beneath a collection of interests that extend 
into the community. Chiefs’ courts in the PoCs 
have generally preferred to uphold marriages 
to avoid complicated divorce settlements and 
the conflicts that might follow, even if this 
comes at the cost of effectively licensing the 
husband’s abuse against the wife.
A typical example was heard in Bentiu PoC 
on 1 February 2016. A woman opened a case 
claiming that her husband had beaten her. 
She had fled her home with her child and 
gone to her aunt’s house within the PoC. Her 
husband followed her and tried to make her 
return, but she invoked the authority of her 
father to allow her to stay. The court ruled 
in favour of the husband and told the wife 
to return to him. The chiefs stated that: ‘it is 
normal that two partners can quarrel’. They 
took time to advise the husband that he 
should get to know his wife’s father better so 
that there is no quarrel between them. They 
also advised the accused man that ‘he must 
respect his wife and share with her a better 
life, not an unfaithful life’. Both parties and 
the crowd assented to the ruling.
Courts prioritised the interests of the hus-
band and the family over the individual secu-
rity and rights of the wife in cases of domestic 
violence. Divorce could be obtained only if the 
husband or family were willing, and the bride 
price could be repaid. Chiefs might still con-
demn the violence, depending on its severity. 
The probable gains for a woman bringing a 
case of domestic violence were the chance to 
expose the problem and obtain mediation, as 
chiefs intervened to encourage better rela-
tions between the couple and their families.
Court Processes: Creating Security 
and Trust
The court hearings promoted a sense of pub-
licity and the idea that when individual and 
familial problems and threats are exposed and 
Ibreck and Pendle: Community Security and Justice under 
United Nations Governance
Art. 16, page 10 of 17
shared, then everyone can feel more secure. 
While dialogue was dominated by chiefs, the 
parties, their relatives and the audience gen-
erally were also able to participate and voice 
their views. It was not only that the Nuer 
community was discursively constituted by 
the chiefs; it was also made real by the peo-
ple who brought cases to court and attended 
as observers. Social relations and trust were 
built through the process.
The courts referred to the individual accused 
or complainant as a member of a family, bind-
ing them together. Families were involved in 
interrogations and received or gave compensa-
tion on behalf of a family member; they were 
also treated as offended parties in instances 
of premarital sex or adultery. The chiefs 
expressed commitments to all who brought 
cases to the court, whether as perpetrator or 
victim. They recognised their dignity as Nuer 
people, with a deep social bond – an idea that 
was shattered by the violent disputes, tensions 
or criminality that brought people to court, 
and had to be repaired through the process. 
The court panels reinforced this by working 
together in a cooperative manner, supporting 
each other, even while airing different opin-
ions. Chiefs sat alongside each other in a spirit 
of firm collaboration. Through their use and 
support of the courts, people were able to par-
ticipate in building trust.
Yet the concepts of social repair and trust 
advanced by the chiefs were deeply bound 
up with paternalism, as exemplified in a 
case on 15 July 2015. A 14-year-old girl was 
brought to court accused of having a rela-
tionship with a 17-year-old. The boy was 
asked to marry the girl and she was asked to 
declare her love for him publicly in the court. 
He refused on the basis that he did not have 
any money to marry, his father was not there 
and his elder brother was not yet married. A 
relative of the girl became angry, criticising 
him as ‘from Rubkona, people from there 
don’t tell the truth’. The chiefs intervened 
with a lesson on Nuer morality. Four of the 
chiefs spoke, each in similar tones, advising 
the relative not to cause trouble after the 
matter was settled in court. They warned the 
girl to ‘learn from the mistake that happened 
to you’ and to avoid the boy in order to pre-
vent violence: ‘your brothers will take the law 
into their hands and beat this man’. Finally, 
they fined the boy 1500 SSP and warned him: 
‘don’t cause instability and insecurity. Please 
go peacefully.’ Relatives of the parties and 
the wider community voiced their views and 
encouragement throughout the process.
In the above case, and in many others, the 
question of evidence – of whether the rela-
tionship between the boy and girl was more 
than hearsay – was barely investigated. The 
chiefs and observers assumed that the person 
who brought the case had good reason for 
his suspicions and indeed parties in the case 
often confessed. It was accepted as a matter 
of unspoken principle that the parties would 
bring a case in good faith, and the chiefs would 
reach their judgement on the same terms.
Hybrid Justice and Security?
The legitimacy of the chiefs’ courts in the 
PoCs rested mainly on their relationships 
to the community. Yet they were still con-
cerned to ‘broker’ relations with UNMISS, as 
the overarching authority, in the same way 
that chiefs have historically negotiated their 
roles with governments (Leonardi 2013). 
UNMISS’ attempts to engage with the com-
munity, through the IMDRM and support for 
community policing, had mixed results. But 
there is some evidence of adaptations to UN 
authority.
The Community Watch Groups were the 
most tangible point of connection between 
the courts and UNPOL. At times, it seems 
the CWGs collaborated effectively with both 
the chiefs, and UNPOL (UNMISS 2017). But 
cooperation was undermined by the fact that 
ongoing support was limited. For instance, 
CWG members pointed out that they lacked 
basic resources and did not even have a sup-
ply of notebooks in which to write down 
complaints they received (interview, Juba 
PoC3, 15 July 2015).
UNPOL’s encouragement of community 
security actors entailed some risks – a point 
best illustrated by the fate of the N4 in the 
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Juba PoCs. Initially, the N4 was closely linked 
to customary authority as it comprised mem-
bers from four areas in the Nuerland and had 
over 250 youth members. On occasion, its 
members were responsible for abuses and 
were brought to court and disciplined (Ibreck 
and Pendle 2016: 30). But the group was har-
nessed by community-led camp management 
structures recognised by UNMISS, and it 
gained a new name in 2016, the ‘Community 
Emergency Response Team’ (CERT). By 2017 
it had merged with the CWG as part of a ‘pub-
lic order team’ under the authority of the 
camp chairman. Over time new challenges 
emerged, but UNPOL stopped providing 
them with ‘capacity building’. By May 2017, 
the security team had become notorious 
for demanding taxes and issuing threats or 
administering beatings, as the court observ-
ers commented: ‘The N4 has gone beyond 
repair. This cannot be solved by training, they 
are continuing committing these beatings. 
We are receiving women complaining every 
day. . . Two women had abortion [miscarriage] 
because of beating’ (group discussion, Juba, 
18 May 2017).
Even though UNMISS maintained its dis-
tance from the courts, the chiefs showed 
some consideration of the mission’s perspec-
tive, by paying lip service to international 
human rights norms. On 29 July 2015, in 
Juba PoC3, a woman brought a case against 
her husband for divorce, accusing him of 
being abusive and irresponsible for not sup-
porting her. During the trial, all the chiefs 
advised the woman that wife beating was 
normal because it is a way of ‘disciplining the 
women in our custom as Nuer’. In closing, 
the head chief declared that the panel had 
found no proper reason for a divorce and that 
the woman should go back to home to her 
husband. But he warned the husband of the 
dangers of physical fighting or beating, and 
reminded him that human rights abuses were 
not accepted by UNMISS in the PoCs.
In a few cases, there were more concrete 
examples of respect for UNPOL. A court 
report from 7 September 2015 in Juba PoC3 
noted: ‘punishments were not given as 
UNPOL was present and they do not allow 
beatings or corporal punishments.’ In this 
case, the Community Watch Group had 
found a group of men who were beating 
another man ‘almost to the point of death 
because of a misunderstanding.’ The weap-
ons used included knives, sticks and pangas. 
The case was brought to court within hours 
of the offence and a panel of 11 chiefs settled 
the matter promptly, issuing a series of heavy 
fines to each of the defendants.
In contrast, chiefs and affected parties were 
anxious about the time it took for UNPOL to 
respond to violence, especially in the cases 
of rape that they had referred directly to the 
mission. A creative response to this problem 
was apparent in a case in Juba PoC3 in May 
2016. The case was brought by a middle-aged 
Nuer woman against a young man, whom she 
accused of raping her child. She brought the 
case to customary authorities immediately 
after her discovery of the incident. The court 
swiftly gave its ruling before referring the 
case to UNMISS. A panel of seventeen judges 
and more than forty people were in attend-
ance. The woman expressed her fear that the 
harm to her daughter was so extensive that 
it was possible she would die. The defendant 
admitted responsibility: he promised that he 
would marry the young girl and that would 
pay ‘everything needed’ to her mother. The 
court rejected this proposal for forced, child 
marriage and instead decided that the man 
should be sentenced to jail for six years and 
would pay compensation for treatment of 
10,000 SSP and a fine of 5000 SSP. The perpe-
trator handed over 5000 SSP, but complained 
that he should not face imprisonment or the 
rest of the fines. Witnesses to the proceed-
ings supported the judgement.
Chiefs improvised in the courts, and norms 
were evolving and being contested within the 
PoCs. In a case on 3 November 2015, a young 
woman, who accused her husband of beating 
her, spoke out against the chiefs for their fail-
ure to grant a divorce, and criticised their ‘out-
dated traditional rules that do not respect the 
rights of women.’ The courts became forums in 
which residents grappled with the competing 
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claims of authority, and views of security and 
justice, in an unfamiliar environment.
The chiefs’ reasoning was in tension with 
the norms of international humanitarian 
‘protection’ and yet the differences were 
not irreconcilable. The UN protection actors 
sought connections to community actors, and 
customary courts were attentive to their new 
context. Some court cases indicate the scope 
for a dialogue in the interests of protection. 
In theoretical terms, a blending process could 
be informed by a relational perspective on 
human security (Held 2005). This would value 
relations of care – while acknowledging that 
they are ‘not always good or pure’ – and treat 
dialogue and ‘moral deliberation’ as central 
to security (Held 2005: 158), while also chal-
lenging inequalities and injustices (Robinson 
2011: 5). In practical terms, the chiefs’ courts 
could, and sometimes did, serve as a public 
space for honest ‘moral deliberation’.
Conclusion
After December 2013, thousands of South 
Sudanese sought security by physically mov-
ing to the UNMISS PoCs. They gained a form 
of sanctuary and access to basic humanitar-
ian needs due to the military protection of 
patrolling UN peacekeepers, and the efforts 
of international humanitarian organisations. 
However, the PoCs remained insecure and 
unpredictable environments.
The people in the PoCs sought to address 
the problems within the sites with their own 
familiar protection strategies. Chiefs’ courts 
were swiftly established and became one of 
the key institutions of public authority within 
this unique legal space, under UN govern-
ance. They produced their authority through 
the provision of justice; remaking custom; 
and fostering a sense of a common Nuer com-
munity. The courts did not have the jurisdic-
tion to deal with the most severe crimes, but 
were still important in tackling physical vio-
lence and pre-emptively dealing with threats 
of widespread insecurity. They filled a gap in 
justice and security provision that could not 
be addressed by UNMISS due to legal and 
resource constraints.
Close examination of the processes and 
judgements based on extensive court records 
suggests that the guiding principle in many 
rulings was the holding together of the moral 
community of the PoC and the promotion of 
a relationship of trust between its members. 
The courts did not treat the litigants as indi-
viduals, but instead as members of a family 
and community. Legal consequences were 
generally corporate and reproductive of gen-
der and generational inequalities. Court rul-
ings focused on remaking communities and 
trust within families, the PoC communities, 
and the wider Nuer community.
The courts were positioned precariously 
between the PoC communities and the 
‘government’ of UNMISS. The chiefs could 
not fulfil their historical role of brokers on 
behalf of the community since their judicial 
authority was not recognised, and there was 
an abiding risk that their decisions could 
be questioned. But the courts continued to 
operate and to make rulings that contra-
vened international norms. From the per-
spective of the courts, security continued 
to depend upon prioritising the family and 
community in decisions. UNMISS routinely 
asserted commitments to individual rights 
and security, but could not respond quickly 
to uphold their protection. The indetermi-
nate and tense relations between customary 
authority and UNMISS eroded the principle 
upon which the courts operate: that a sense 
of community and relations of trust are 
foundational for security.
These experiences in South Sudan provide 
wider lessons in relation to settlements of 
displacement, refuge and protracted crises 
around the world, especially when there are 
plural justice and security providers. They 
affirm that notions of trust, social unity, and 
‘social harmony’ (Porter 2017) may be domi-
nant in popular understandings of justice 
and security. They also encourage recognition 
of the role of customary justice processes in 
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the construction of legitimate authorities 
and the fostering of collective identities and 
norms. People do not abandon their politics 
or agency when they flee into political exile 
(Malkki 1996).
Our findings are relevant to recent recom-
mendations for reforms in peace missions 
towards greater ‘engagement’ with commu-
nities (HIPPO 2015). The communities that 
are made real in the courts have exclusionary 
dimensions and implications in the broader 
political landscape. Their focus on maintain-
ing community relations undermines indi-
vidual human rights, especially the rights of 
women. But this presents a conundrum, since 
the role of the courts in building a notion of 
a community of trust and legitimate author-
ity is also central to their security function 
and persistence in crisis settings.
The lessons of the chiefs’ courts in South 
Sudan are threefold. Firstly, even during a 
civil war, and among displaced people, where 
security may seem to depend mainly upon the 
actions of militaries and police, justice practices 
endure and remain essential. People invigorate 
them both as a mechanism to resolve disputes 
and as a social practice through which they 
publicly assert their dignity and unity as mem-
bers of communities.
Secondly, in South Sudan and other coun-
tries with long histories of war and political 
turbulence, legitimacy can be constructed by 
providing accessible and predictable forums 
to resolve conflicts (Weigand 2017). The 
authority and legitimacy of customary chiefs 
is related to their consistent availability, and 
capacity to achieve fast settlements. The 
aspiration for continuity is surely part of the 
explanation for the slow penetration of inter-
national human rights norms.
Thirdly, in such settings, the question of 
security depends less upon empowering a sin-
gle authority, than upon building relations of 
trust between plural authorities, and ‘custom’ 
is not averse to problem-solving, adaptation 
or ‘hybridization’ (Lawrence 2017). Therefore, 
we should consider not only whether justice 
and security providers conform to certain 
norms, but also whether they are prepared to 
enter into cooperative relationships and dia-
logues with competing authorities, includ-
ing international peace missions. We should 
also ask international actors to reflect on 
their own limitations and adopt approaches 
to human security that are relational (Held 
2005) and focus on justice (Human Security 
Group 2016) – these would be more familiar 
to, and inclusive of, the communities they 
seek to protect.
Notes
 1 This account was recorded during a dis-
cussion with four paralegals and a chief 
who were involved in trying to resolve 
the case (18 May, Juba).
 2 Six researchers in Juba PoC3 documented 
338 court cases and two researchers at 
Bentiu PoC documented 57 cases from 
July 2015-2016. Naomi Pendle undertook 
fieldwork in Bentiu in 2014 and Rachel 
Ibreck in Juba in July 2015, January 2016, 
May and August 2017. The analysis also 
draws on Pendle’s doctoral research in 
the western Nuer in 2012–14. More than 
twenty South Sudanese lawyers, parale-
gals and activists contributed to the court 
observation project established by Rachel 
Ibreck and Alex de Waal at the Justice 
and Security Research programme (JSRP) 
at LSE and facilitated with the support 
of Justice Africa. For further detail on 
the methodology see Ibreck and Pendle 
(2016).
 3 The costs varied and rose with inflation, 
exceeding 1000 SSP by 2017. The South 
Sudanese Pound (SSP) lost more than half 
of its value during the court observation 
research period and one dollar averaged 
around 18 SSP on the official exchange 
rate, but more unofficially.
 4 The ethnic composition of the camps 
changed in Juba after an upsurge of vio-
lence in the capital in July 2016 and the 
spread of the war to surrounding areas. 
This brought its own set of challenges 
and alterations in chiefs’ courts. For 
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instance, the Shilluk elected their own 
chief who sometimes sat on court pan-
els. The details of these changes are not 
explored since during the court observa-
tion research period (July 2015–2016) 
the Nuer and their courts predominated 
in both research sites.
 5 As stated on an UNPOL form designed 
to refer cases to the IMDRM, and given 
to the Community Watch Group in Juba 
PoC3, 11 January 2016.
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